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LEGAL ANATOMY OF AN AIR
POLLUTION EMERGENCY
By Doug Rendleman*'
INTRODUCTION

In November 1971 in Birmingham, Alabama the emergency
section of the federal Clean Air Act was used for the first time.
Particulate emissions had combined with an inversion to raise
Birmingham's particulate count over 750. Neither the state nor the
local government was able to act. The federal Environmental Protection Agency, early in the morning of November 18, secured a
temporary restraining order. Twenty-three major industries, employing a total of about 25,000 production employees, were ordered
either to phase down or to curtail production in order to lessen
particulate emissions drastically. Less than 36 hours later the temporary restraining order was dissolved on the motion of the Environmental Protection Agency.
This article will discuss the legal aspects of the November crisis.
The federal emergency legislation and its legislative history will be
examined, and the Environmental Protection Agency's response to
the legislation will be summarized, with an emphasis on particulate
pollution. With the federal framework thus explained, the article
will describe the local background: the setting of Birmingham and
its air pollution problem, the then operative state and local controls, and the events of the emergency itself. Attention will then
turn to the lawsuit, United States v. U.S. Steel, which was the Environmental Protection Agency's solution for the November crisis;
an analysis will be made of the temporary restraining order secured
therein and its dissolution the next day. Following a summary of
the events of the lawsuit, the article will consider the fundamental
legal problems attendant to the regulatory process. The lack of
notice to the Birmingham defendants and the difficulties that resulted are singled out for extended comment. In addition, hard-
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ships arising from the use of "temporary" orders to attain "final"
relief are discussed. The writer concludes that the order should
have been preceded by notice and by some splecies of hearing, especially since it might have been foreseen that the order would be
effectively final. The writer then explores possible remedies for
incorrectly enjoined defendants, finds them wanting, and suggests
an amendment to the legislation in order to ameliorate injustices
created by incorrect emergency orders.
THE LEGISLATION

The serious federal scheme of air pollution control began in
1967.1 The legislation authorized funds for state and local regulatory programs and required HEW (1) to divide the nation into
areas and regions, (2) to promulgate criteria for air quality in each
region, and (3)to issue technological documents to the states. The
states were to set standards and to establish plans for enforcement.
Although the state and local governments had primary responsibility for enforcement, HEW could act to enforce state standards
if the state was not enforcing its own standards and if the pollution
traveled interstate. In the case of intrastate pollution, HEW could
only act upon a request by the governor of the state. HR 9509, the
administration bill, contained no emergency powers. S. 780 included emergency powers which became §108(k) of the Air Quality
Act of 1967. It provided:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, the Secretary,
upon receipt of evidence that a particular pollution source or combination of sources (including moving sources) is presenting an imminent and substantial endangerment to the health of persons, and
finding that appropriate State or local authorities have not acted to
abate such sources, may request the Attorney General to bring suit
on behalf of the United States in the appropriate United States
district court to immediately enjoin any contributor to the alleged
pollution to stop the emission of contaminants causing such pol2
lution or to take such other action as may be necessary.
The 1967 Act was unsatisfactory. The procedure to establish
standards and attain compliance was cumbersome and time-consuming.' For example, as of September, 1970 only one case had proceeded beyond the preliminary conference stage. In that case, it
had taken five years-through the conference, to the public hearing and the courts-to shut down a Maryland chicken-processing
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factory. 4 There were not enough funds or personnel in either the
state or the federal governments. Enforcement, in short, was difficult.5 There is no indication that any action was taken under the
emergency powers in §108(k).6
The Clean Air Amendments of 19707 were designed to remedy
the defects in the earlier legislation. The Environmental Protection
Agency was created to assume responsibility under the Act. With
respect to establishing criteria and standards the 1970 Amendments
do not require the extended procedure required by the earlier
legislation. Moreover, the 1970 Amendments delegate to the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency substantially
more power to intervene in state implementation and enforcement.
The emergency provision from the 1967 Act was carried forward
by the 1970 Act;' it requires both (1) pollution which "is presenting an imminent and substantial endangerment to the health of
persons" and (2) state or local inaction. Both the committee reports
and testimony before the committees shed light on the language.
When the Clean Air Act was enacted in 1967, the Senate Public
Works Committee and the House Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce stressed the need for the emergency provision
as an interim measure to allow some control while the Secretary
of HEW was developing enforcible standards." The emergency exception, the committees felt, was not designed to short circuit the
elaborate procedure of the rest of the act for "chronic or generally
recurring pollution problems."'10 Rather, it was to be used when
"there... [was] an unusual atmospheric inversion or other extraordinary grouping of circumstances creating a substantial and imminent danger to public health. ."11 Both reports cited as examples:
Donora in 1948, London in 1952 and 1962, the Meuse Valley in
Belgium in 1930, and New York City in 1953.12 According to testimony before and material submitted to the House Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, at Donora "an industrial town
which, in 1948, normally recorded about one death every 3 days,
17 people died in a single 24-hour period during a 4 day smog.""
During the London fog of 1952 "4,000 more deaths occurred in
that city than would normally have happened during a similar
period of time."'14 The cause of these tragedies, according to material submitted to the committee by the Public Health Service,
seems to have been sulfuric acid. 15 Such events are in the words of
former Surgeon General Dr. Stewart "dramatic and tragic"'" and
emphasize the need for effective emergency remedies. 7 It was ap-
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parent after the 1967 legislation that Congress intended the emergency provisions to apply to the serious, the exacerbated and the
immediately dangerous pollution hazard.
Section 303 of the 1970 amendments reenacted the emergency
provision of the 1967 legislation with some technical changes.,,
Legislative documents reveal a new sense of urgency and purpose.
The Senate Report on S. 4348 stated:
The legislation reported by the committee is the result of deep concern for protection of the health of the American people. Air pollution is not only an aesthetic nuisance. The Committee's concern
with direct adverse effects upon public health has increased since
the publication of air quality criteria documents for five major
pollutants (oxides of sulfur, particulates, carbon monoxide, hydrocarbons and oxidants). These documents indicate that the air pollution problem is more severe, more pervasive, and growing at a
more rapid rate than was generally believed. 19
The statement on the federal government's emergency powers
reveals a new emphasis and a changed definition of emergency:
The committee believes that this emergency authority is necessary
to provide for immediate, effective. action whenever air pollution
agents reach levels of concentration that are associated with (1) the
production of significant health effects, (2) incapacitating body
damage, or (3) irreversible body damage in any significant portion
of the general population. The term "significant portion" is not
intended to exclude sensitive elements of society as asthmatics, but
only those groups of particularly susceptible persons for whom other
precautionary measures should be taken. Secondly, the emergency
situation exists whenever there is any perceptible increase in the
mortality rate.
The levels of concentration of air pollution agents or combinations
of agents which substantially endanger health are levels which should
never be reached in any community. When the prediction can
reasonably be made that such elevated levels could be reached even
for a short period of time-that is that they are imminent-an
emergency action plan should be implemented to reduce emissions
of air pollution agents and prevent the occurrence of substantial
endangerment. 20
The Committee felt that vigorous emergency action should be
forthcoming from the federal government:
The Committee is not satisfied with existing State and local air
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pollution alert strategies. Recommendations that children not run
to and from school and that events be suspended are not a substitute
for reducing pollution. The Committee believes that air pollution
alerts authority should include plans which provide for the immediate reduction of21 non-essential operations which contribute to
an episode situation.
Thus, with a heightened sense of urgency and a broader sense of
emergency, Congress handed the Administrator the old legislation
in new clothes.2
Information and guidelines promulgated by the Environmental
Protection Agency in August and October 1971 to assist States in
drafting plans also bear on the meaning of emergency. These
criteria do not bind the federal administrator's discretion to act
under §303. Nevertheless, they are relevant in defining an emergency since the regulations cite §303 and distinctly hold out the
possibility that if the quality standards are exceeded and if the
state either lacks a plan or fails to act under an existing plan, then
the federal administrator will act under the powers granted in
§303.23 Each state plan for a Priority 1 region must include, as part
of a graduated response to a possible pollution episode, a "contingency plan" to decrease emissions in an emergency. An emergency
episode is "an immediate and serious threat of significant harm to
24
the health of any significant portion of the general population."
The plan must be divided into two stages, warning and emergency.
It must be preventative rather than remedial: the local authorities
must be prepared to act in anticipation of the actual emergency
levels "to prevent ambient pollutant concentrations at any location
reaching such levels which would cause significant harm
."2; Concentration levels for six polluto the health of persons,
...from

tants are included in the regulation: only particulate matter will be
discussed herein. A preventable emergency is defined as 1,000 particulate micrograms per cubic meter.2 6 Accordingly, an emergency
may be declared when the particulate count reaches 875 "and
meteorological conditions are such that this condition can be
expected to remain at the above levels for twelve (12) or more
hours. 27 The plan must include "an emergency episode plan." The
Regulations set out examples which "reflect generally recognized
ways of preventing air pollution from reaching "emergency
levels."2 In an emergency it is suggested that open burning and
incineration be forbidden. In addition, almost all employers "shall
immediately close operations." There are exceptions for distribu-
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tion and sale of medical supplies and food and for vital public
services. Motor vehicles may not be used except with police approval. Sources of pollution in general must eliminate pollution
"to the extent possible without causing injury to persons or dam29
age to equipment."
There are two other stages of response in the regulation examples. A pollution alert may be declared when the particulate
count averages 875 for 24 hours and that level can be predicted to
continue for twelve hours. In an alert, open burning is forbidden,
the use of incinerators and boiler lancing or soot blowing is limited,
and "unnecessary" vehicle use should be eliminated. Pollution
sources should diminish or defer production, delay polluting waste
disposal, lessen heat loads, and use midday turbulence as much as
possible in order to reduce pollution substantially. The second
level of response is the pollution warning that is to be declared
when the particulate count reaches 625 and can be predicted to
continue for twelve hours in the absence of control action.31 In a
pollution warning, emission and activity controls are intensified.
For example, in addition to eliminating unnecessary vehicle use,
the public is asked to use car pools and public transportation. The
suggested classified manufacturing regulations are, for the alert,
"substantial" or "maximum" reduction of pollution, and, for the
warning, "elimination" of pollutants." The final level of response
is the emergency which was discussed above. 3 Under the examples,
the classified manufacturing industries-will have reached maximum
pollution control in the pollution warning, so that nothing further
is required in the pollution emergency.84
THE LOCAL BACKGROUND

Birmingham8 5

Birmingham is a steel and iron city located between mountains.
The mountains supply raw material for several major industries
and prevent air circulation that would dispel some of the air's
particulates, sulphur oxide and carbon monoxide. A "dark cloud
of industrial waste" is endemic in the industrial sections of Birmingham. Federal authorities designate a particulate count of 260
as a critical level which should not be exceeded more than once a
year. The downtown Birmingham monitoring station recorded a
particulate count in excess of 260 on 67 days in 1970; in April,
1971 the downtown count reached 607. The 1970 average for the
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industrial North Birmingham monitoring station was 280. Dr.
Russakoff, a Birmingham physician, conducted a study of resident's
lung functions and reported that 30% of those tested in North
Birmingham had in this regard measurable deterioration." Patients
with lung diseases were told by Birmingham doctors, "Leave Birmingham or buy a coffin."
State Law
State and local officials were powerless to control ambient pollution, simply because, until 1971, governmental regulation of air
pollution was almost nonexistent. The Alabama Air Pollution Control Commission was required to issue a permit to a violator of its
rules if the violator submitted a plan to attain compliance with the
rules within seven years. The violator was allowed "a reasonable
time" to study the problem and to develop the plan. 7 This legislation had been drafted by industrial representatives; significantly,
Alabama was the only state to be refused federal matching funds
under the Clean Air Act for air pollution control. Public concern
and a dramatic pollution episode in April 1971 led to new legislation. The Governor announced that he would sign the strongest
anti-pollution bill the legislature could pass. The legislature acted
and much stricter legislation became effective on September 3,
1971 " In an air pollution emergency, the Governor almost has the
power to declare martial law. He may, for example, by proclamation, "prohibit... the burning of any materials whatsoever."8 The
governor may call out the National Guard; and enforcement officials "may use such reasonable force as is required." 40 Yet in November 1971, an emergency could not be declared under the new
state legislation since the commission members had been appointed
only about a week, the commission director had not yet been selected, and Jefferson County (Birmingham) had no operative emergency regulations. Thus, the local and state officials "were without
effective legal authority to abate an... emergency situation.'
November, 1971
On the 14th and 15th of November, 1971, particulates began to
accumulate in Birmingham and Jefferson County.42 The particulates did not dissipate because of poor atmospheric mixing, or what
is frequently called an inversion. On Monday afternoon, November
15, the National Weather Service issued an Air Stagnation Advisory
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for central Alabama, and the Bureau of Environmental Health of
the Jefferson County Department of Health began additional air
sampling at selected monitoring stations. The Department of
Health declared an air pollution alert at 10 a.m., November 16
because samples for the 24-hour period ending at 8 a.m. revealed
a particulate count of 771 at North Birmingham and 397 in downtown Birmingham. The public was notified by the news media.
Twenty-three industrial sources, each estimated by their own data
to contribute 100 tons or more of particulates to the air each year,
were telephoned and asked to reduce overnight emissions voluntarily. At 4:30 p.m. on November 16, the Department of Health
issued an air pollution warning because of a particulate count of
722 in North Birmingham. Notices from Dr. Hardy, a Health
Officer of the Department, were delivered to the 28 industries
"requesting ... substantial reductions in particulate emissions as
soon as possible." The request was specific: "Due to the seriousness
of the situation, this office feels that an overall particulate emission
reduction on the order of 60% is justified." In addition, the 23
sources should "maintain said reduction until the warning is terminated." The Health Department also asked for prompt written reports of any emergency action taken and an estimate of particulate
reduction. This "pollution warning" had, of course, no legal ef43
fect.
At 8 a.m. on November 17 the North Birmingham particulate
count was 758; the Weather Service continued the Air Stagnation
Advisory for 24 hours. The Health Department called the industrial sources that morning to learn the effect of the pollution Warning. Nine of the 28 reported that they were reducing particulate
emission 60% or more; 8 reported reductions of 20 to 60% and 6
either could not estimate reductions or were reducing emissions
less than 20%. Because, however, the major sources of particulates
were among the 6 which could not estimate reductions, the combined efforts to reduce particulates were effective only to the extent
of 15%. Written replies were received from 18 of the 28 sources
later in the day. On the basis of these replies, it was estimated that
total emissions of particulates might be reduced 25 to 30%, about
half of the reduction requested on November 16.
Throughout the episode, the Jefferson County Health officials
had consulted the Alabama Department of Health and the State
Attorney General. The latter, in response to a pollution crisis in
April, had a nuisance action pending in Jefferson County Circuit
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Court against several of the industrial sources. National and regional offices of the federal Environmental Protection Agency had
been in communication; and on the morning of November 17 the
Emergency Operations Control Center of the Environmental Protection Agency asked whether their office could come to Birmingham as observers. The county and state health officials, aware of the
Environmental Protection Agency's emergency powers under the
Clean Air Act,4 granted the request. The state and local officials
met with Environmental Protection Agency representatives and
attorneys from the United States Department of Justice on the
afternoon of November 17. An Environmental Protection Agency
spokesman told a late-afternoon press conference that his agency
was reviewing the problem and that recommendations for action
would be released later.45
The upshot was United States v. U.S. Steel.40 The Environmental
Protection Agency's case consisted of a complaint, three affidavits,
and a motion for a temporary restraining order. A temporary restraining order was granted by District Judge Pointer at his home
on November 18, 1971 at 1:45 a.m. The complaint was dismissed
and the temporary restraining order dissolved on the government's
motion on the morning of November 19. The next portion of the
article will examine the case in depth.
UNITED STATES V. U.S. STEEL

The complaint alleged a particulate count of 725, which was
caused or contributed to by the 23 named defendants. There were
further allegations that the pollution presented "an imminent and
substantial endangerment to the health of persons," and that state
and local officials had been diligent but unsuccessful in their efforts
to abate the pollution crisis. The complaint recited the Environmental Protection Agency's emergency powers under §303 of the
Clean Air Act,47 alleged irreparable harm, and asked for an injunc-

tion requiring the 23 defendants to "cease the discharge of particulate matter into the ambient air ...

and not discharge such

matter thereafter unless pursuant to instruction to do so from this
Court."
The motion for an immediate temporary restraining order alleged that particulate pollution from the defendants' operations
combined with "adverse weather conditions" to cause a "present
and continuing" health hazard. In addition, the motion alleged
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the defendants' lack of response to local attempts to reduce atmospheric contaminations. The court was asked to issue the temporary
restraining order without notice to the defendants "on the ground
that the discharges constitute[d] an imminent and substantial endangerment to the health of persons." The order that was then requested was less drastic than the injunction prayed for in the complaint. Rather than ask the court to require the defendants to
"cease" emissions, the government requested that, while action on
the complaint was pending, the court restrain the defendants temporarily "from discharging excessive particulate matter into the
ambient air."
The motion was supported by three affidavits. Dr. Hammer, an
Environmental Protection Agency specialist in general preventative
medicine, stated his opinion that "exposure to ambient particulate
levels of greater than 700 micrograms per cubic meter per twentyfour hours for two consecutive days would constitute ...

an im-

mediate and serious threat of significant harm to the health of a
significant portion of the general population." Robert Kornasiewicz, an Environmental Protection Agency meteorologist, stated
that the Birmingham forecast office of the National Weather Service had issued an Air Stagnation Advisory. This meant that "there
is limited vertical mixing of pollutants" and "unless emissions of
pollutants are curtailed or terminated, the concentrations of such
pollutants will increase." There was, according to Mr. Kornasiewicz, a possibility that the stagnation advisory would be suspended
because of a frontal system that was moving toward Birmingham
from the west. However, it was noted that the frontal system could
stop or slow down and that it was not expected to reach Birmingham until 11:00 a.m. November 19; moreover, even if it
did reach Birmingham, "dispersion .

.

. [would] still be poor for

some time." Charles Robinson, supervisor of the air pollution control program for the Jefferson County Health Department, provided the pollution count. Sampling between 2 p.m. on November
15 and 2:30 p.m. on November 17 revealed particulate counts of
722, 728, 758 and 771; and the average particulate level for the
45 hours ending at 2:30 p.m. on November 17 was 725.
The affidavits supported the allegations of the motion, and pursuant to the emergency power in §303 of the Clean Air Act and the
49
4
federal rules of civil procedure, the court was empowered to act.

The temporary restraining order, which was signed at 1:45 a.m., is
specific in its terms and broad in its application." The 27 affected
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operations were separately treated. The order was tailored to each
operation, and it compromised the limiting or arresting of particulate pollution with concern for the enterprise and production
equipment. The order read, in part:
U. S. STEEL CORPORATION-Fairfield Works
Must stop the emission of particulate matter from incineration,
scrafing, slag quenching, open burning and other operations that
can be postponed.
Must increase coking time to the maximum extent possible consistent
with gas heating requirements.
Must reduce emissions of particulate matter from all open hearth
furnaces by ceasing feed to the open hearth and maintaining the
heat. (Emphasis added.)
In general, the industries were allowed to finish work in progress:
BIRMINGHAM STOVE AND RANGE COMPANY
Must eliminate emissions of particulate matter from all cupolas
adding no new charges and shutting down cupolas after present heat
is finished....

VULCAN MATERIALS COMPANY-Fairfield Works
Must eliminate emissions of particulate matter by phasing down
all operations as rapidly as possible without causing damage to
equipment. (Emphasis added.)
Some operations, however, received a stiffer dose:
W. J. BULLOCK, INC.
Must eliminate emission of particulate matter by shutting down all
furnaces and smelters and stopping all incineration processes.
(Emphasis added.)
A hearing on the preliminary injunction was set for 9 a.m. on November 19, 32 hours after the temporary restraining order was
issued. The complaint, affidavits, motion and order were reproduced. Marshalls began serving the papers together with summons
early in the morning of November 18. Some of the industries received a telephone call at 5:30 a.m. or 6 a.m. on the 18thY'
In the hours between the grant of the temporary restraining
order at 1:45 a.m. on the 17th and the hearing on the preliminary
injunction at 9 a.m. on the 19th, the pollution crisis ended. Birmingham was blessed with, among other things, an autumn rain
that "washed" the particulates out of the air. The North Birming-
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ham high volume particulate sampling results for November 16, 17
and 18 were 771, 758 and 410. The particulate count on November 19 was 98. At the 9 a.m. hearing on the 19th which was
scheduled to take up the federal government's request for a preliminary injunction, Mr. Mallard, attorney for the United States,
made this request:
This order was obtained under the emergency power section of the
Clean Air Act, which is designed to give the government the power
to control certain emergency conditions. And it is not designed to be
permanent or semi-permanent in nature.
Now, the emergency conditions were the conditions of a two-day
particulate count of 771 and 758, which did exist when the order
was secured. Now, with improved atmospheric conditions, for
instance, I understand that the North Birmingham sample for this
morning, which was not a 24 hour sample, but a sample from 3 p.m.
yesterday to 8 a.m. this morning was 217 micrograms per cubic
meter which is unusually good for that area. Based on this and other
consideration, our medical and air pollution experts believe the
emergency situation has passed. This temporary restraining order
has served its purpose and contributed to the easing of the pollution
problem here, and we now request it be vacated, that our complaint
be dismissed.
We have no further requests.52
The defendants, it seems, had been expecting something else. Several had motions to dissolve and vacate the temporary restraining
order and some were prepared to contest the preliminary injunction. Judge Pointer dissolved the temporary restraining order54
and dismissed the complaint.5 The defendant industries could then
resume production; several attorneys left the hearing to call their
clients. Judgment was filed the same day.56
LEGAL PROBLEMS

The remainder of the article will deal with hardships which
flow from the nature of the adjudication and with possible renedies. United States v. U.S. Steel was hastily conceived. Late in the
afternoon of November 17, the Environmental Protection Agency
could reveal no concrete plans, 57 yet the lawsuit was started and the
order was granted less than two hours into November 18. The reason for the haste was the exigency of doing something to reduce
the health endangering particulates in the atmosphere. The major
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legal difficulty was the lack of notice to the defendants. In addition,
the order, although denominated temporary, was, in practical
terms, final because it required an immediate response from the
defendants. The emergency was ephemeral and the order was dissolved the next day. Thus the order was secured and the emergency
was over before the defendants were heard on the issues. The problems of notice and practical finality are interrelated, as both result
from the factual nature of the legal problem. Certain conventional
ideas about the litigation process, it may be observed, are ill fitted
to an explanation of this case.
Notice
The temporary restraining order, as discussed above, was issued
without notice to the defendants. The government's decision to
seek an injunction was probably reached late on the 17th; and, in
deciding whether to give notice to the defendants, the continuing
health hazards to the people of Birmingham were probably balanced against the procedural rights of the defendants. The decision
to seek judicial relief under the emergency powers in §303 was,
perforce, based on educated estimates. Weather prediction is an
aleatory science and particulate sampling is, no doubt, subject to
wide variation. Statistical bias and possible error lurk in every
figure. The order was granted without notice in the early hours of
the morning at Judge Pointer's home and required action from
the defendants as soon as they were informed of its terms. The defendants were informed that they were subject to an order of the
federal court later in the morning either by a telephone call or by
service of the order by a marshall. The defendants were surprised
by the order, but the "writing was on the wall" for all to see, and
it would be naive to think that they did not know something was
about to happen.
The 1970 Amendments to the Clean Air Act, the Alabama legislation, and the legislative history of both, reveal a change in the
climate of opinion from apathy to urgency. 8 The definition of an
emergency, as the congressional sources show, followed the
change."9 Any definition of emergency must, unless it requires that
people be dying on the streets, be an arbitrary point in a continuum of estimated harm. In April 1971, the particulate count in
North Birmingham had reached 791, but there were no serious
official statements that industry should shut down. In November,
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however, when the particulate count passed 700, the stage was set
for a different response. Pollution control has to start somewhere;
and control started dramatically in Birmingham. Birmingham industry was not, however, prepared for the change in attitude. The
new start was a shock in part because of earlier commiseration for
industry. The substantive provisions of the November 18th order,
although unprecedented, were authorized by the law. 0 Attorneys
for the industries were outraged. Some of the outrage should have
been anticipated because of the drastic change in enforcement policy. Some of the outrage, however, could have been prevented by
sedulous procedural fairness. Failure to extend procedural protection to the defendants exacerbated rather than ameliorated the
shock and outrage which was due to the change in the application
of the substantive law.
Fair procedure should allow the adversary a reasonable opportunity to present his side of the controversy to the tribunal before
it decides. Notice that litigation has been commenced performs this
function because the defendant is informed of the time, place and
subject matter of the hearing. 1 If the losers have "the feeling that
they are being fairly dealt with,"6 2 the pill of defeat goes down more
easily. Conversely, the moral force and perceived legitimacy of the
court's order is reduced if the loser views the decision as a fiat.
Mr. Alley, who represented several of the defendants, commented
at the November 19th hearing:
It is the federal government that walked in and said y'all step aside,
we take it over. But it is the federal government also that had no
6
conversation whatsoever with these industries or their attorneys. 3
Mr. Johnston said:
I have been a member of this bar I think about 42 years, and this
court has, during that time, so far as I know, an ironbound rule,
that they would not issue injunctions or temporary injunctions without notice to somebody representing the defendants. This is the
first time in my recollection it has ever64been done with possible
exception of instances of public violence.
and:
The United States Government could have found out who represented these defendants, could have told them this thing was coming
up, and I think this action by the EPA and Department of Justice
is wholly without precedent in this community, and I want to say

104
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that I hope this court will admonish them' in the future. . . . [T]o
come in here in the middle of the night and get injunctions without
65
notice to me, is unthinkable.

Some of these imperious statements may be hyperbole or histrionics. There is, however, some legitimacy to the grievance and if
notice had been given, this venom would have had much less sting.
Other reasons for notice relate to precision in the litigation
process. If the defendant is given notice and is present at a hearing,
he can participate in the process of finding facts, applying the law
and, in equity cases, formulating the decree. 6 Ex parte procedure
may be subject to abuse because, in the absence of the defendant,
the facts will be found from either a verified petition or, as was the
case in United States v. U.S. Steel, affidavits. 67 The defendants in
United States v. U.S. Steel took the opportunity of the November
19 hearing to object to possible infirmities in the fact-finding process and to argue that their clients had lost an opportunity to
exonerate themselves. Mr. Alley argued:
We have unprecedented situations where this court, on the motion
of the government, in effect shut down 23 separate defendants'
operations with not one bit of evidence that any one of those
defendants individually was contributing whatsoever to this cause,
to this problem. There was no evidence that there was anything
...(relating) this emergency to what a particular defendant was
doing.6
Others were more specific. Some of the industrial defendants were
more than 10 miles from the sampling station, 69 others had already
installed control equipment"0 or had responded to the Health Department's earlier warning.7 1 The industries to be enjoined were
selected from a list drawn up in 1969.72 Thus some of the defendants' points may have been well taken. The argument is a follows:
if these defendants had been given notice and a reasonable opportunity to present material to the court, then they could have shown
factually that they were not contributing particulates into the atmosphere. Some of the defendants' assertions were captious. For example, it should not take more than 10 minutes of proof to connect
any given industrial source to the general pollution problem.
Nevertheless, because of the ex parte nature of the procedure, both
the government and the defendants lost the opportunity to have
an adversary hearing on the facts.
There may have also been some fundamental legal arguments
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that could have been presented to the court before the order was
granted. Section 303 had never been used, and at the November
19th hearing the defendants expressed some doubt about the legal
standard as applied to the facts. Was there an "emergency"? 73 Were
state and local action having an effect?74 Did the pollution abate
because of the order or because of a change in the weather and, if
the latter, should the order have been dissolved earlier?8 There is
the additional problem of formulating the decree. The temporary
restraining order was less severe than the proposed injunction76 and
seems to have been drafted with a view to avoiding unnecessary
harm to the defendants. 77 At the hearing on motion to dissolve,

some of the defendants argued serious production losses. Blast
furnaces, if stopped, require several days of start-up time before full
production is resumed; and Mr. Johnston asserted that "after closing down, it will take them five days to get started.

7

8

Judge

Pointer, whose sedulous concern for the hardships created by the
temporary restraining order was evident throughout the November
19 hearing, took the position that there should have been no
harm because the order was drafted to allow the mills to maintain
blast furnace heat and only required the defendants to cease feeding new material.80 If the defendants had participated in formulating the order, many of these misunderstandings could have been
substantially obviated.
If notice had been given to the defendants, then the adjudication
might have been fairer. Notice in advance of adjudication is the
almost unexcepted norm, but ex parte temporary restraining orders
may be lawful and, as a practical matter, at times may be necessary."' It is assumed, however, that the ex parte procedure will be
used only in the exceptional case. Courts of appeals have criticized
district courts for granting temporary restraining orders without
notice when some notice could have been given. 2 Rule 65(b) was
amended in 1966 "to make it plain that informal notice which may
be communicated to the attorney rather than the adverse party, is
to be preferred to no notice at all."83 Notice should be given "if
feasible" and the Advisory Committee suggested that "some expedient, such as telephonic notice to the attorney for the adverse
84
party, be resorted to if this can reasonably be done.
In United States v. U.S. Steel there must have been a time,
after the decision to seek a temporary restraining order and before
the order was granted, when the government could have called the
defendant industries' executives or their attorneys. Many of the
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plants are 24 hour operations and, under the liberal provisions of
Rule 65(b), a call to a night foreman could have been acceptable.
Attorneys for U.S. Pipe and Foundry had specifically asked the
government for advance notice of any anticipated legal action.8
Nevertheless, no notice was forthcoming. The industries had to be
informed of the order before they became bound by it;80 and, unless
the defendants knew of the order, they could not have complied
with it. It takes several hours to adjust a complex industrial process; and a telephone call to the defendants after the decision to
seek the order might have allowed them to take proper steps and
thereby have advanced compliance several hours. The Environmental Protection Agency's purpose was to end the pollution crisis
by reducing particulate emissions. This purpose might have been
better served if the early morning telephone calls, which informed
the defendants of the order after it had been granted 7 had been
made several hours before the order was sought.
It is, on the other hand, possible to view the matter differently.
In retrospect, if notice had been given to the defendants by telephone a few hours before the order was sought, they probably
would have asked for a continuance to prepare. The crisis which
called for action called for immediate action. If a hearing had been
scheduled far enough in advance to allow meaningful preparation,
there may not have been any need for the order because the particulate pollution might have been dissipated by changes in the
8
weather.

The procedure used by the Environmental Protection Agency
followed Rule 65(b), which specifies that "written or oral notice"
is unnecessary if:
(1) it dearly appears from specific facts shown by affidavit or by
the verified complaint that immediate and irreparable injury, loss,
or damage will result to the applicant before the adverse party or
his attorney can be heard in opposition, and (2) the applicant's attorney certifies to the court in writing the efforts, if any, which have
been made to give the notice and the reasons supporting his claim
that notice should not be required.
The motion and supporting affidavits in the Birmingham case were
conclusory and only 8 pages long. Irreparable and immediate harm,
the first condition for an ex parte temporary restraining order, was
"proved" with the affidavits in support of the motion. The possible
89
weaknesses of affidavit proof have been mentioned above.
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The second requirement for an ex parte temporary restraining
order is that the attorney certify the efforts, if any, to give notice
and the reasons why notice should not be required 0 A separate
certificate, however, is not to be found in the record. The motion
asked that "said temporary restraining order ...

be issued forth-

with and without notice, on the ground that the discharges constitute an imminent and substantial endangerment to the health of
persons." The government did not assert that they were ignorant
of the names of the corporation executives or their counsel or that
they could not find the plants. Nor did the United States assert that
"the defendant[s], if put on notice that a temporary restraining
order was being sought, might be able to accomplish that which
it is sought to enjoin before the order could be obtained."91 The
government apparently felt that if harm to the public were serious
and presently occurring, procedural niceties could be ignored.
92

Practical Finality

The difficulties which resulted from the ex parte procedure were
several. Since the defendants had no opportunity to participate in
the fact-finding, law-applying, and decree-formulating process, they
were irritated by what they regarded as judicial fiat. If there had
been notice, some of the defendants might not have been enjoined
and some parts of the decree might have been different. These hardships were exacerbated by the nature of the order. The purpose of
a temporary restraining order is to preserve the existing state of
affairs until the court can schedule an adversary hearing. Temporary restraining orders are thought to be necessary because they
may be "the sole method of preserving a state of affairs in which
the court can provide effective final relief.

'9 3

Because of the one-

sided procedure and the possibility of abuse, temporary restraining
orders are subject to several limitations. 94 It is not meaningful to
discuss the order in United States v. U.S. Steel in conventional
terms; and the conventional protections do not help the defendants.
First, the order called for an immediate response: the defendants
were required to cease, alter, or inhibit their conduct. Second,
rather, than laying the foundation for "effective final relief," the
order itself was final relief. The pollution episode subsided, although the precise reason therefor is unknown. Hence, the temporary order was at least the final relief, even if it is not certain that
it was also the effective relief. After the crisis ended, there was
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nothing left to be done except to dissolve the order and dismiss
the complaint. Mr. Mallard, moving to dissolve, stated: "IT]he
emergency situation has passed. This temporary restraining order
has served its purpose and contributed to the easing of the pollution
problem here, and we now request it be vacated, that our complaint
be dismissed." 95 The order, it seems, was designed to end a temporary emergency rather than to lead to future proceedings; if any
such order is successful, there is no need for further proceedings.9 6
The difficulty with the government's theory is that, to corrupt a
figure of speech, it leaves things up in the air.
The use of ex parte temporary orders to obtain final relief is
nothing new. Despite the rhetoric about preserving the status quo
and about "effective final relief," the ex parte temporary injunction
has long been used to grant petitioners final relief, in the form of
suppressing dissent, 7 and, before the Norris La Guardia Act, in
the form of breaking strikes. 98 Its innovational use in United States
v. U.S. Steel lies in its application to a new class of defendants.
Because of this application, industry has now been treated as labor
was treated prior to the Norris La Guardia Act and as Martin
Luther King, Jr. was treated in his Birmingham civil rights demonstrations. 99
Hardships
The effects of the order in United States v. U.S. Steel could have
been severe. In addition to loss of production and profits, possible
damage to equipment and lost wages, 100 corporate images were
tarnished. Mr. Wagnon stated:
In this day of public awareness of the responsibility of corporations
to their communities, it's economically hurtful when the fact they
have been subjected to an injunction, is publicized in the local
community and national community and to their boards and to
their stockholders

.,

10

Few would disagree with enjoining the uncooperative polluter in
an emergency and most would agree that it is better to do too much
than too little to end a pollution episode. Most would also agree
that it is better to move with celerity than circumspection. Haste
may, however, create injustice. In United States v. U.S. Steel, the
government's emission figures were almost two years old.102 One of
the defendants, the W. A. Belcher Lumber Co., was ordered to shut
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down its wood-burning boiler. At the hearing on November 19,
Mr. Denaburg, Belcher's counsel remonstrated:
It appears to us some time ago somebody made a list of the defendants which included us on it. And my company has taken certain
steps over the last year which... included shutting down a large
percentage of their air operation to such a degree that we take the
position that we have not contributed anything to any pollution in
over two months.... (W)e would like to... get off this list if we
can. 03
Mr. Alley commented, "If you ever get on it (the list), there is no
way to get off."'0 4 Any industry which, like Belcher, has been incorrectly required to halt operations because of government error may
justly protest. The force of the protest, moreover, is all the more
compelling if the error could have been reasonably prevented by
giving notice to the industry before the order was secured and by
allowing the industry to offer proof to the court. Given the fact
that an industry is incorrectly enjoined, the problem then is
whether that industry has any tangible remedies.
Remedies
The hardships for an incorrectly enjoined defendant are compounded because they seem to be uncorrectable. Assume .that a
case arises where the defendants, similar to those in United States
v. U.S. Steel, are ordered to halt production immediately to abate
a pollution emergency. The order is granted without notice to any
defendant, even though notice was "feasible." The emission figures
upon which the order is based are two years old and, in the interim,
new equipment has been installed which reduces the defendants'
particulate emissions almost to zero. Assume also that there will
be losses because of wage continuations pursuant to a union contract and because of missed deadlines. The defendant, nevertheless,
complies with the order. Two days later, upon plaintiff's motion,
the order is dissolved and final judgement is entered dismissing the
complaint. The defendant resumes production. There has been
error: defendants should not have been enjoined; if notice had
been given, defendants could have persuaded the court not to
enjoin.
The order may be said to have been effectively or practically final
because it requires an immediate response. If the decree has practical finality, would it then be appealable as of right?10 5 After the
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order is dissolved, however, the right to an immediate appeal is
not too important. First, if there is a final judgement, the defendant may appeal from it. Second, as a practical matter, the question
of whether the defendant should respond when informed of the
order will almost always be moot before an appeal can be
mounted 00 Where the order requires immediate action, neither
a motion to dissolve107 nor an appeal will eliminate losses, although
either may shorten the period of unnecessary compliance.
The defendant could violate the order and argue as a defense
to contempt that, because of the lack of notice, it is void. An erroneous temporary restraining order must, however, be obeyed pending dissolution or appeal, since a defendant who breaches an order
may be precluded from arguing, as a defense to contempt, that the
order was erroneous.0 Notice defects in temporary orders, while
erroneous, do not void the order. 0 9 Thus, the defendant, oppressed
by a temporary restraining order granted without notice, may
neither violate it nor appeal." 0 His only choice is to obey or to be
held in contempt of court; and the point, if one there be, is that
temporary restraining orders are trial court law and depend on the
almost uncorrectable good sense of the district judge.
It may be argued, elaborating on the above, that the temporary
restraining order is a final judgment because it was effectively final.
Yet, as a final judgement granted without there first having been
personal jurisdiction over the defendant, the judgement should be
void."' If the order has been violated, voidness could then be
argued as a defense to contempt. Avoiding punishment is, however,
not relief; and the voidness argument would be risky because it
is novel. In addition, non-compliance with court orders is inevitably a treacherous course. 1 Once the order is signed and served,
the defendant's safe alternative is to grit his teeth and comply. If
the defendant obeys the order, the problem of voidness is about as
important as the problem of finality."' The defendant needs, but
does not have, a quick method of raising his arguments before an
appropriate forum. Yet, the Environmental Protection Agency has
the initiative and the defendants have Hobson's choice.
If the incorrectly enjoined defendant cannot be relieved from
obedience to the order, may he later have compensation for his
losses? There are several factual and legal questions left over from
United States v. U.S. Steel which must be answered by an appropriate tribunal. What was the particulate count and the weather
forecast? Does this combination endanger health? Is the affidavit
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conclusion, that a particulate count in excess of 700 for 2 consecutive 24 hour periods endangers health, based on a reasonable medical judgement? Were the state's efforts to abate the crisis attaining
an adequate response? Which defendants were, at that time, contributing excessive particulates to the atmosphere? Was the danger
to health dire enough to constitute an emergency under §803 of
the Clean Air Act? If there was an emergency, could a defendant
who was not polluting be ordered to shut down and send employees
home under the general power to reduce activity in an emergency?"" None of these questions has been answered in an adversary proceeding.
If these questions are answered favorably to the defendants or
to any one defendant, may they or he have compensation for losses
suffered because of the order? At the November 19th hearing in
United States v. U.S. Steel, Judge Pointer wondered whether the
district court should retain jurisdiction. 115 Counsel for the defendants protested against retaining supervisory jurisdiction and
argued that jurisdiction should be retained only to determine the
amount of compensation due their clients."-6 Judge Pointer raised
the problem of governmental immunity"1 and, of course, dismissed
the case"18 leaving the question of compensation open, as it yet
remains.
If the plaintiff had been a private party, the defendants could
have adjudicated the issues upon an application against the injunction bond. 19 The United States, however, is specifically exempted
from the security requirement. 20 Perhaps, here again, the defendants are without a remedy. Short of a suit for malicious prosecution, the remedy against the bond is the exclusive remedy for an
incorrectly enjoined defendant.' 2 ' Because no security is required
of the United States, it may be inferred that there may be no recovery if an injunction is wrongfully procured by the United States.
In other words, it is the usual case of prosecutorial discretion.
Superimposed on this is the sovereign immunity, which bars recovery of damages. The defendants, pursuant to the judgement and
statute may recover costs, 22 but that will be far short of full
recompense.
The Fifth Amendment declares that the United States may not
take private property for public use without paying just compensation. A cause of action, called inverse condemnation, is available
to recover the value of property which has been effectively taken
by a government defendant, even though there has been no formal
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exercise of eminent domain.12 3 If the effect of government action
is to deprive the owner of all or almost all of his benefit from the
property, then there will be a taking in the constitutional sense.
The government is not, however, required to compensate for all
the economic loss which flows from governmental activity; and the
problem is to determine when the burden should be borne by the
public as a whole rather than the individual owner. 24 The cases,
12
unfortunately, are in a state of disarray. 6
Inverse condemnation would be a weak reed for recovery for the
defendants in United States v. U.S. Steel. The courts have uniformly upheld destruction of private property to enforce regulatory policies. 26 Congress has the power to enact the Clean Air Act,
including the emergency provision; and that power includes the
power to enforce the act. Property, moreover, was not "destroyed"
by the temporary restraining order in United States v. U.S. Steel:
the defendants were not allowed full economic use of their property
for a time and it was "returned" to them intact. As Justice Brandeis
stated in a dissenting opinion:
Every restriction upon the use of property imposed in the exercise
of the police power deprives the owner of some right theretofore
enjoyed, and is, in that sense, an abridgment by the State of rights in
property without making compensation. But restriction imposed to
protect the public health, safety or morals from dangers threatened
is not a taking. The restriction here in question is merely the
prohibition of a noxious use. The property so restricted remains in
the possession of its owner. The State does not appropriate it or
make any use of it. The State merely prevents the owner from
making a use which interferes with paramount rights of the public.
Whenever the use prohibited ceases to be noxious,-as it may because of further change in local or social conditions,-the restriction
will have to be removed and the owner will again be free to enjoy
2
his property as heretofore.1 7
Excessive smoke which interferes with another's use and enjoyment of property is an enjoinable common law nuisance.128 The
public at large has a statutory right to breathe clean air. 2 If there
has been any interference with property, it has been caused by
accumulated pollution from the defendants' factories; and it is not
reasonable that the public be made to pay (at least directly) for the
right to be free from pollution that endangers life and health.
The cases hold that "in times of imminent peril.., the sovereign
could, with immunity, destroy the property of a few that ... the

BIRMINGHAM AIR CRISIS
lives of many more could be saved."' 130 If there is an emergency and
imminent peril demands immediate action, the government may
act under the police power and not incur any liability. 131 There is
an impressive body of medical evidence for the proposition that
extended exposure to a high level of particulates in the atmosphere
is a definite health hazard; and, although the precise point where
particulate count, weather forecast, and health emergency become
congruent is somewhat a matter of individual choice, the evidence
supports the assertion that a particulate count of 700 for 48 consecutive hours will cause serious problems for vulnerable segments
of the population and will even cause some deaths. 32 The economic
interests of the defendants must be considered in the context of the
health of Jefferson County's people. As Justice Brandeis said in
the dissent quoted above:
[T]he right of the, owner to use his land is not absolute. He may not
so use it as to create a public nuisance; and uses, once harmless, may,
owing to changed conditions, seriously threaten the public welfare.
Whenever they do, the legislature has power to prohibit such uses
without paying compensation; and the power to prohibit extends
alike to the manner, the character and the purpose of the use .... 13
The government, some cases hold, may respond to an emergency
with measures which affect those who are not causing the harm. If
the circumstances are grave and imminent, and if the measures
taken by the government have a reasonable relation to the emergency, then the government will not be said to have acted unconstitutionally. The wartime evacuations of Japanese-Americans are
an example. There, a racial classification which certainly included
in a dragnet many who were not potential saboteurs (and certainly
excluded potential saboteurs), was evoked to impose severe burdens
upon those segments of the population. It was, because of an emergency, upheld by the courts.3 4 Perhaps, in United States v. U.S.
Steel, some industries were enjoined which should not have been.
The emergency, however, was grave, and the measures had a reasonable relation to the emergency. Inverse condemnation does not
seem to provide redress.
A PROPOSED

AMENDMENT

Thus, the corporate good-citizen who has cooperated, installed
controls, and reduced emissions may, due to an informational lag,
be swept into the Environmental Protection Agency's wide net. It
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may be ordered, at midnight, to cease production, yet, under present law, it has no effective remedy. Few would quarrel with ordering a habitual polluter to close down in an emergency, but the
plight of a defendant like W. A. Belcher Lumber Co. evokes sympathy.3 5 Congress should consider an amendment to the emergency provisions of the Clean Air Act 86 to provide recompense for
those who may be incorrectly enjoined in an emergency.
The amendment should put strict limits on recovery. Either an
agency tribunal or the district court should have jurisdiction. Damages should be allowed if, based on information which was available when the order or injunction was granted or could have made
available at a hearing, the injunction was either incorrect in general or incorrect as to a certain defendant. Recovery should be
limited to actual pecuniary loss, for example, wage continuation or
a penalty for failure to meet a deadline. There should be no recovery for intangible injury, such as loss of good will because of bad
publicity.
This proposed amendment should not stay the Environmental
Protection Agency's hand; and the emergency powers should be
as useful as ever. The amendment would encourage certainty before legal action and discourage ex parte procedure. It is always
sound policy to exchange information; and enjoining defendants
who are neither before the court nor informed of the proceedings
has, at best, a marginal utility. The amendment would, in short,
allow needed recovery for incorrectly enjoined defendants. It
would, however, also provide a forum to litigate questions concerning the Environmental Protection Agency's emergency powers.
This forum may be useful, since, as discussed above, there is currently no practical way to question ex parte temporary restraining
orders secured in response to a pollution crisis and dissolved when
the crisis ends.
CONCLUSION

In November, 1971, the Environmental Protection Agency's
emergency power was used for the first time. As has happened to
other lawsuits in Alabama which have involved federal-state relations, United States v. U.S. Steel was reported in the national
press. 8 7 Several aspects of the lawsuit are subject to criticism. The
particulate count was high, but Birmingham had come to expect
that. The Environmental Protection Agency defined, and the court
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accepted, a particulate count of over 700 for 2 consecutive days as a
preventable emergency. While this may be commensurate with the
generalized intent of Congress, 18 it is less stringent than the Environmental Protection Agency's own guidelines for state emergency
plans.3 9 The Environmental Protection Agency failed to give
notice to the defendants before seeking the order and did not file
a certificate to excuse notice. This violates both the letter and the
spirit of federal rule 65(b). These defects created hardship and ill
will both of which might have been reduced or eliminated by better
procedure. The governmental litigant has more responsibilities
than has a private party. 40 It should not only be fair, but appear
fair. The writer questions whether the Environmental Protection
Agency met its responsibilities in United States v. U.S. Steel. The
order in United States v. U.S. Steel can be seen as a dragnet, obtained at midnight by arbitrary government bureaucrats. Present
law unfortunately provides neither a forum to litigate these issues
nor a means of redress for a defendant who may have been abused.
Environmental protection and clean air are popular issues, but
the Environmental Protection Agency should be mindful of George
Bernard Shaw's statement: "There is no more dangerous mistake
than the mistake of supposing that we cannot have too much of a
good thing."
There are, on the other hand, several factors which may have
justified the order. The Environmental Protection Agency, after
all, was not making a profit by poisoning Birmingham's air. The
defendants' behavior in the past had been callous and refractory,
and it was necessary to convince them that the government meant
business. At the hearing on November 19, many of the industries
proclaimed their desire to cooperate and be reasonable. 141 Perhaps
it will be even easier to gain their cooperation in the future. In
addition, if the order could have been issued before the 7 a.m. shift
began, there might have been substantial wage savings to the
defendants. There was a need to move with dispatch because of
the imminent hazard to the health of several hundred thousand
people. Notice there was none, but the crisis obviates the need; and
the defendants must have known that something serious was about
to happen. The order was tailored to industrial needs and based
on the best information available. It was, finally, dissolved as soon
as possible. United States v. U.S. Steel is cloaked in an overwhelmingly opaque ambiance, much like an atmosphere full of suspended
particulates. Nothing is very clear. Part of the shroud is due to the
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clamoring compulsion of the emergency. Much is due to the Environmental Protection Agency's unfortunate failure to act in the
open.
The November 1971 crisis and the case of United States v. U.S.
Steel came in the hiatus between inchoate concern and operative,
effective administrative regulation. There had been very little of
the planning and coordination which could have eliminated many
of the hardships. 142 The public was alert, the legislation had been
passed, and the standards were available, but the machinery to deal
with the crisis was not functioning. If the Environmental Protection Agency had not acted, no one could have. In this sense, the
action taken was exactly what Congress intended. 43 State emergency plans should, in the future, eliminate the need for federal
emergency action. These plans will provide some certainty because
they will be keyed to specific particulate counts and promulgated
in advance by a regulatory body with expertise and continuing
responsibility. 144 Proposed control plans which require sources to
eliminate or reduce particulate sources 45 could clean up the air
over a period of years, and thereby eliminate the need for any emergency plan. 146
The final results are not in. Despite the furor of November, on
December 3, 1971 the particulate count in North Birmingham was
487. Not long after the November crisis, on the other hand, U.S.
Steel announced plans for a new steel manufacturing process at
the Fairfield works. This, it is estimated, will remove 99% of the
pollution. 47 Much has been done and more plans have been made,
but a great deal remains to be done. Emergency powers, in the
meantime, should be held in ready reserve. The real solution lies
not through the drama of a shutdown order, but through united
effort and hard work over a long period of time.
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37 Code of Ala. Title 8, §295(c), Recompiled 1958, Supp. 1969; repealed by Act No. 769, Regular Session 1971, §20.
38Alabama Air Pollution Control Act of 1971, Act. No. 769, Regular
Session 1971.
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No. 769, §11(g).
Testimony of George E. Hardy, Jr., M.D., M.P.H., Health Officer,
Jefferson County Department of Health, Before the House Subcommittee on Health and the Environment of the House Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, U.S. House of Representatives;
Convened in Birmingham, Alabama on Saturday, November 20, 1971
[Hereinafter cited as November 20 Hearings].
42 This paragraph and the two following are summarized from Dr.
Hardy's testimony at the November 20th Hearings.
43 See text at note 37 supra.
4442 U.S.C. §1857h-(1) (1970).
45 End of summary of Dr. Hardy's testimony, note 42 supra.
40 CA 71-1041 (N.D. Ala. November 19, 1971). This paragraph and
the three paragraphs following are summarized from documents in
the court file.
47
Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, the Administrator, upon receipt of evidence that a pollution source or combination of sources (including moving sources) is presenting an imminent
and substantial endangerment to the health of persons, and that appropriate State or local authorities have not acted to abate such sources,
may bring suit on behalf of the United States in the appropriate United
States district court to immediately restrain any person causing or
contributing to the alleged pollution to stop the emission of air pollutants causing or contributing to such pollution or to take such other
as may be necessary. 42 U.S.C. §1857h-(1) (1970).
action
48
FED. R. Civ. P. 65(b).
49 See also 28 U.S.C. §1345, 42 U.S.C. §1857h-(3) (1970).
5 0 See generally, Developments in the Law: Injunctions, 78 HAuv.
L. REv. 994, 1064-67 (1965).
51 United States v. U.S. Steel, CA 71-1041 (N.D. Ala., Nov. 19,
1971), Transcript of Hearing before Judge Pointer at 22, 33 (hereinafter cited as November 19th Transcript).
52 November
19th Transcript at 2-3. Quotations from the hearing
transcript have been edited only by correcting what seemed to me to
be obvious stenographic mistakes. Extemporaneous speech, the reader
should bear in mind, may read poorly. The compensating virtues are
the flavor and spontaneity which, I hope, are retained.
53 See e.g. November 19th Transcript at 6-7 (Mr. Wagnon).
54 November 19th Transcript at 3.
51November 19th Transcript at 37; See FED. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1).
51 United States v. U.S. Steel, CA 71-1041 (N.D. Ala., Nov. 19, 1971).
57 See text at note 45 supra.
5 8 See text at notes 7, 19-22, 38-40 supra.
H See text at notes 19-22 supra.
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61 Cf. Sims v. Green, 161 F.2d 187 (3d Cir. 1947).
62 F. James, Jr., CIVIL PROCEDURE 2 (1965); see also Rosenberg, Devising Procedures That Are Civilized to Promote Justice That is Civilized, 69 MICH. L. REV. 797, 797-803 (1971).
63 November 19th Transcript at 28.
64 1d. at 14-15.
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66 Carroll v. President and Commissioners of Princess Anne, 393
U.S. 175, 183 (1968); cf. Sims v. Green, 161 F.2d 87 (3d Cir. 1947).
67 Carroll v. Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 183 n.10 (1968); Developments in the Law: Injunctions, 78 H~Auv. L. REV. 994, 1060 (1965).
68November 19th Transcript at 11.
69Id. at 25.
7 1Id. at 27, 35-36.
71 1d.
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were not tangibly affected by the order. The public relations effect
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72 November 20th Hearing at 1.
7n November 19th Transcript at 5, 15.
741Id. at 7, 19, 20, 29, 31, 34.
75
Id. at 20, 28-31.
76
See p. 22-23 supra.
77See
p. 22-23 supra.
78November 19th Transcript at 15-16, 20.
79
Id. at 17, 22, 25-26.
80 Id. at.20, 26.
81 FED. R. Civ. P. 65(b); Carroll v. President and Commissioners
of
Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 180 (1968).
82 Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v. Transport Workers Union, 278 F.2d
693, 694 (3d Cir. 1960); Arvida Corp. v. Sugarman, 259 F.2d 428, 429
(2d Cir. 1958).
n 39 F.R.D. 69, 124-25 (1966), Advisory Committee Notes to
Amendments to Rule 65, effective July 1, 1966.
" Id. See also Carroll v. President and Commissioners of Princess
Anne, 393 U.S. 175 (1968), which required a strict standard for notice
in first amendment cases.
s5 November 19th Transcript at 22 (Mr. Matthews).
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FED. R. Crv. P. 65(d); Backo v. Carpenters Local 281, 438 F.2d
176, 180 (1970); In re Herndon, 325 F. Supp. 779, 780 (M.D. Ala.
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87November 19th Transcript at 22.
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Durbin Farms v. NFO, 446 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1971);
Great Northern R.R. v. Brosseau, 286 F. 414, 416 (1923); F. FRANKFURTER 9c N. GREEN, TiH LABOR INJUNCTION 65, 188-89 (1930).
0 Emery Air Freight Corp. v. Local 295, 449
F.2d 586, 591 (2d Cir.
1971). 39 F.R.D. 69, 125 (1966); the Advisory Committee's notes on
Amendments to Rule 65(b), effective July 1, 1966 state: "This certificate is in addition to the requirement of an affidavit or verified complaint setting forth the facts as to the irreparable injury which would
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Northington, the attorney for Defendant Housing Authority. Although we had discussed the matter previously, on April 18, 1972, I
informed Mr. Northington of the fact that this suit would be filed
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Lavender v. Housing Authority of the City of Northport, Alabama,
CA 70-965 (1972).
91C. A. Wimurrr & F. W. ELLIOT, 1971 Pocket Part to 3 BARRON &
HOLTzOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, §1432 (1972).
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93 Developments in law: Injunctions,
78 HAav. L. REv. 994, 1060
(1965).
94 FED. R. Crv. P. 65(d) provides in part that, "Every temporary restraining order granted without notice shall be indorsed with the date
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terms within such time after entry, not to exceed 10 days, as the court
fixes, unless within the time so fixed the order, for good cause shown,
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97 See Carroll v. President and Commissioner of Princess Anne, 393
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(1930); Walker v. Birmingham, supra note 97. There are many differences. There was no similar howl of execration from the Birmingham
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10 4 Id. at 36.
105 See United States v. Wood, 295 F.2d 772 (5th Cir. 1961).
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107 FED R. Civ. P. 65(b) provides in part that, "In case a temporary
restraining order is granted without notice, the motion for a preliminary injunction shall be set down for hearing at the earliest
possible time and takes precedence of all matters except older matters
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the application for a preliminary injunction and, if he does not do so,
the court shall dissolve the temporary restraining order. On 2 days'
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125 United States v. Caltex (Philippines), Inc., 344 U.S. 149, 156
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